Introduction
The regulation of corporate groups is a challenging task. Groups come about in different permutations and they often present a tension between the economic reality whereby they operate as a single entity and the legal position which allows them to be split into separate legal persons. 1 In the context of cross-border insolvency, groups' structures present two key regulatory challenges. One is how to facilitate an efficient procedural coordination of the insolvency proceedings (including group-wide restructurings) where the group is spread across different countries; and the other is, how to deal (in the course of insolvency) with scenarios of heavily integrated groups whose assets or debts have been intermingled.
Although group structures are likely the most common structure for large cross-border enterprises, it took international bodies quite some time before they have started addressing the matter. UNCITRAL Working Group V (which deals with insolvency law reform) took on board to address both the domestic and international aspects pertaining to groups in 2006, a project that was finalised in 2010 and resulted in a set of recommendations added to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. 2 Yet, the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (the Model Law) 3 is still confined to single companies. The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (the EC Insolvency Regulation) 4 does not deal with corporate groups either. The Regulation is now undergoing revision, though, and it is expected that some consideration of the group scenario will be taken on board, even if the issue may not be fully addressed at this stage. 5 UNCITRAL Working Group V is now also
deliberating on the refinement of the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law, specifically in relation to the notion of COMI and associated issues, which may have implications to groups. 6 Here too, though, it is expected that the cross-border insolvency of groups will not be fully addressed at this stage. Evidently, the regulation of groups is a complex task and therefore may require an incremental process, whilst the debate regarding regulating groups in insolvency is ongoing.
In light of these recent developments and the expectation that more will come in terms of INSOL composed a thorough report with proposed amendments to the Regulation including an in depth consideration of the group problem. Its recommendations may, therefore, have an impact within Europe (either at this stage of the revision or later on) and beyond. It is also the case that any new rules regarding groups that may be enacted by regional or international bodies will follow a process of implementation in domestic regimes or application by 4 Council Regulation 1346/2000. 5 In light of the short timetable for finalising the revision it is expected that some issues (including further consideration of harmonisation of insolvency laws) will be postponed to a second regulatory stage. 6 See latest report: A/CN.9/742 Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the work of its forty-first session, New York, 30 April-4 May 2012.
national courts which will require understanding of the purpose and policy considerations underlying the rules. Certain legal regimes are already undergoing consideration of reform of their group insolvency laws. Others may follow suit. These initiatives could also benefit from the work of organisations such as INSOL, specifically INSOL's proposals regarding groups. This is especially so as the proposals seem to go somewhat beyond mere cross-border procedural aspects, and address, for example, the circumstances where substantive consolidation should apply. Generally, the proposals could contribute to the general debate regarding the regulation of groups in insolvency.
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What is in the INSOL's proposals?
INSOL's report deals with the group problem quite comprehensively. One chapter is devoted to groups and proposes the concepts of coordination via a group main proceeding and of substantive consolidation (Chapter V). Another chapter suggests the concept of EU rescue plans specifically targeted at corporate groups (Chapter VI). Further references to groups are evident in the proposed amendments to the definitions in the Regulation (Chapter I) including that of COMI, which is the focal point of the Regulation.
Understandably, the proposals do not deal with certain other matters pertaining to groups in insolvency such as whether or not to avoid intra-group transactions 8 or whether to make a parent company liable for the debts of its subsidiaries. 9 These matters are certainly outside the purview of the Regulation which is essentially a private international law instrument aimed at unifying matters of jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and choice of law. It is what is interesting to consider is not so much the legal instrument for implementing the rules but rather the concepts themselves, their rationale and desirability.
Structure, aim and methodology of the paper
The paper focuses on the proposals of INSOL in Chapter V of its report, namely the concepts of coordination via a group main proceedings, and substantive consolidation. Consideration of the proposals in other chapters which are also relevant to groups (and to which Chapter V itself refers) will be made throughout the analysis where relevant, though the details of the proposed EU rescue plan (in Chapter VI of the report) are outside the scope of this paper. In the rest of the paper, the proposals regarding coordination and substantive consolidation will be first described. It will then be assessed to what extent they can meet the challenge of facilitating the resolution of groups' cross-border insolvency proceedings. This evaluation will take account of both the variety of possible group structures and the goals the insolvency regime would aim to achieve. 10 In the process, the merits of the proposals will be revealed but also their shortcomings.
An overview of INSOL's proposals regarding corporate groups
Appreciating the need to ensure a close and efficient coordination of group proceedings, which may take place in multiple jurisdictions, INSOL suggests that such proceedings will be closely coordinated. It is proposed to achieve this by opening what is termed in the proposal a "group main proceedings" at the jurisdiction of the "ultimate parent company".
11
An ultimate parent company is defined as a parent company which has its centre of main interests ("COMI") in the EU and which is subject to insolvency proceedings under the Regulation (and which itself does not have a parent company which has its COMI in the EU). 12 Subsidiaries are defined as companies which are owned or controlled by the parent company. 13 The definition of a parent company is taken from the 7 th EC Directive on group accounts with some modifications. 14 It is based on the holding of the majority of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in the other company (i.e. the subsidiary), or (if no company meets such definition), having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the other company and being at the same time a shareholder in or member of that other company, or (if no company meets the above definitions), the company that has the right to exercise a dominant influence over another company of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract entered into with that other company or to a provision in its memorandum or Articles of association.
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The idea is then that the proceedings of the group of companies (defined as a number of companies consisting of parent and subsidiary companies) 16 Additional main proceedings will be opened against the relevant subsidiaries in their respective COMIs (based on the same definition, as explained above). The liquidators in the group main proceedings and subsidiaries' main proceedings will be then duty bound to cooperate with each other. 19 Furthermore, the group main liquidator will have powers to intervene in the subsidiaries' proceedings, by analogy to the relationship between "main" proceeding (opened at the company's COMI) and the "secondary" proceeding (opened where the company has an establishment) which has a subordinate nature under the Regulation.
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Importantly, the group main liquidator will be able to ask to stay the subsidiary's proceedings. 21 He may also propose a rescue plan, either based on procedures available in the subsidiary's forum or based on the proposed harmonised EU rescue plan that can be proposed for the group as a whole (namely the relevant parent and subsidiaries). The analogy (to main-secondary proceedings) does not go all the way, though, to allow, for example, the group main liquidator to lodge claims of the parent's creditors in the subsidiary's proceedings, appreciating that the entities are separate and each has its own creditors. 23 In addition, the information to be provided by the liquidator of the group main proceedings to liquidators of the subsidiaries is limited to information which is relevant to the subsidiary's insolvency proceedings. There is no obligation on the part of the liquidator of the group main proceedings to inform the subsidiary's liquidator of the progress made in lodging and verifying claims at parent level, except where the ultimate parent company and the subsidiary are liable for the same debt.
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Finally, it is suggested that in rare circumstances, where the assets, liabilities or agreements of one or more group companies cannot be attributed to a single company within a group and consequently the insolvency proceedings with respect to these companies cannot be conducted in a meaningful way, it will be possible to request the consolidation of the insolvency proceedings. 25 If consolidation is allowed then all proceedings will merge into the main group proceedings, unless there is no parent company, in which case the surviving proceedings will be those to which the greatest value can be attributed. 26 The request to consolidate proceedings should be addressed to the courts which may lose their supervisory role. 27 Main proceedings opened in jurisdictions other than that of the surviving main proceedings, will be converted into secondary proceedings. 28 The assets and debts are then pooled together, yet the court (of the surviving main proceedings) may take measures in order to compensate for any impairment of creditors which result from the consolidation. Even within the hierarchical structures, the definition limits the scope of the proposal (and thus the coordination regime that can apply to group cases) to groups comprising of parent 29 Proposed article 46(5). 30 Below we will consider differences between groups in terms of their functional structure. 31 subsidiary (or subsidiaries) has its COMI in a country outside the EU. In such a case there will be no relevant ultimate parent within the EU that can coordinate the proceedings.
Does the coordination regime maximise insolvency goals, considering different functional structures of groups?
The idea that proceedings opened in different jurisdictions with regard to members of the same corporate group will be coordinated by a group main proceeding -opened in one of the countries involved in the process, will certainly promote efficiency. Efficiency in insolvency entails the maximisation of stakeholders' wealth by seeking the best solution for the enterprise in the course of insolvency and minimising costs involved in the process. 37 If the corporate group was integrated in terms of how it operated its business then most likely the group as a whole (or some parts thereof) is worth more than the sum of the parts. Importantly, the group's stakeholders may benefit from a group-wide plan or a sale of the business (as a whole, or its viable parts which may cross subsidiaries) as a going concern. 38 The problem with this solution (a coordinated regime of a multijurisdictional process) is that we are back with a "one-size-fits-all" approach where we will always seek to decentralise the process and have a multijurisdictional proceedings. At least this is the solution envisaged in the proposal. Admittedly, it is possible under the proposal to open all the proceedings in a single jurisdiction. There is nothing precluding this course of action. However, this solution is not the one explicitly suggested. Therefore, parties (as well as courts) following the guidelines in the proposals would probably expect to find the COMI of the subsidiaries at a place separate from that of the parent's (most likely the registered office or location of assets or creditors). In view of the variety of group functional structures, in particular the fact that while some groups may be decentralised many others may be centralised (closely managed as a whole from a single head office), the solution must be somewhat more nuanced in order to maximise the promotion of insolvency goals.
The proposed clarification to the notion of COMI (in Chapter I of the report) might further diminish the possibility of achieving efficient group centralisations. On the one hand, the proposed new definition (delineated above) stresses the importance of the operational headquarters in determining the location of the COMI. This factor is elevated above other where a much clearer explanation of the meaning of COMI was provided:
"... a debtor company's main centre of interests must be determined by attaching greater importance to the place of the company's central administration, as may be established by objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties. Where the bodies responsible for the management and supervision of a company are in the same place as its registered office and the management decisions of the company are taken, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, in that place, the presumption in that provision cannot be rebutted. Where a company's central administration is not in the same place as its registered office, the presence of company assets and the existence of contracts for the financial exploitation of those assets in a Member State other than that in which the registered office is situated cannot be regarded as sufficient factors to rebut the presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors makes it possible to establish, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, that the company's actual centre of management and supervision and of the management of its interests is located in that other Member State" 55 In a case of a centrally managed group (which in functional terms may operate as a single company with branches) the management decisions are typically taken centrally at the head office which will be a mutual COMI of the respective subsidiaries. The coordination regime suggested in INSOL's proposal, which is based on decentralisation in insolvency may, therefore, result in a mismatch between the economic reality (namely the actual functional structure of the group) and the legal solution.
Finally, the proposal is at odds with the practice. Thus, the experience of applying the Regulation shows that (even in the absence of rules for groups) in many if not most cases of groups, full centralisation regarding some or all relevant entities of the group was possible.
Examples are numerous and include cases such as Daisytek, 56 Crisscross, 57 Cirio Finance Luxemburg SA, 58 Collins and Aikman, 59 MG Rover, 60 Hettlage KghA, 61 Parmalat Capital Lennox Holdings, 68 and Kaupthing Capital Partners. 69 In these cases, the proceedings regarding some or all the subsidiaries were conducted from a single jurisdiction -that of the head office of the group, which could be regarded as the COMI of each of the subsidiaries, due to the centralised nature of the group. It may not be a mere coincidence that in many group cases a mutual COMI could be identified (i.e. that they were centrally controlled integrated groups). Indeed, in this kind of functional structures, the likelihood of a group collapse is greater.
It is worth noting that in some of those centralised cases it was also possible to avoid the opening of additional secondary proceedings, by sending letters of request, giving assurances to local creditors or applying the law of the (potential) secondary forum. 70 In other words, the trend has been thus far one of pragmatism and efficiency, seeking centralisations in insolvency and avoiding the opening of multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions in cases of groups. Indeed, by avoiding the opening of such multiple proceedings considerable costs can be avoided. Clearly, with a concentrated process cooperation is smoother, information is more readily available, court hearings can be easily conjoined and so forth. In other words, wealth is maximised, which is one of the key goals of insolvency. 71 There is no redistribution of rights or defeat of legitimate expectations either, as the centralisation follows the functional reality whereby the entities were centrally controlled. The group centre thus matches the entities' centre, which should be generally apparent to voluntary creditors. In borderline cases, it is possible to compensate specific creditors or apply local laws using the same mechanisms imposed in cases where opening of secondary proceedings was avoided.
The aim and possible mechanisms of avoiding the opening of additional proceedings (be it main or secondary), regarding subsidiaries in the jurisdictions where they had economic presence (i.e. activities, assets, employees and so forth) is omitted from INSOL's recommendation. There is no clear provision (or even commentary) stating that since COMI refers mainly to the objective head office of the company (as INSOL suggests) in cases of centralised groups this would usually be the same COMI for all group members. Nor is there an explanation or suggestion that in such cases it is further possible to avoid the opening of secondary proceedings where it appears that this may not be practical and would incur unnecessary further costs. This is peculiar in light of the approach adopted in the proposals regarding the opening of secondary proceedings. In the proposed amendments to article 27 of the EC Regulation (which allows the opening of secondary proceedings) INSOL suggests that courts would have discretion to abstain from opening secondary proceedings. It is not clear to what extent this approach could apply to opening main proceedings regarding subsidiaries and if so in what ways. The avoidance of centralisation is also at odds with the approach to substantive consolidation (which will be discussed below) where there is greater appreciation of the differences between groups' functional structure. There, it is allowed for certain types of groups to apply a stronger (enterprise based) solution under which assets and debts will be mixed together in the course of insolvency, and to 'correct' any 'errors' in specific cases by compensating the relevant creditors.
Again, a better approach would be somewhat more nuanced. It would explicitly provide for three options. Where the group was integrated and centralised and it is possible to identify a mutual COMI for the group members (in the operational head office) then multiple proceedings should be avoided. A similar approach is proposed by the European Parliament in a draft report with recommendation to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law. 72 There, a flexible regime for the regulation of the insolvency of groups is suggested. Specifically, it is proposed that whenever the functional/ownership structure allows it, proceedings should be opened in the Member State where the operational headquarters of the group are located which should then be recognised automatically. 73 Yet, in other cases where subsidiaries were separately managed, a coordination regime of the sort envisaged by INSOL would be most adequate. A third scenario is where it is not possible to locate a mutual coordination centre, e.g. at the ultimate parent's COMI, 74 in which case coordination may proceed on a more equal basis by applying mandatory rules for cooperation and coordination. The latter type of solution is also absent from the INSOL's proposals.
Maximising fairness and efficiency in cases of intermingled groups
Not many jurisdictions allow for substantive consolidation in their legislation. The concept is undoubtedly contentious since it entails the mixing of assets and debts of otherwise separate legal entities, ignoring the 'corporate veil'. 75 It means that rights may be redistributed in the course of insolvency as 'unless the asset to liability ratio is equal, substantive consolidation will necessarily reduce the bankruptcy distribution to some group of creditors or equity owners.'
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In those regimes that do adopt the doctrine, there is often uncertainty as to the precise circumstances where substantive consolidation should be allowed. 81 Irish law allows, in legislation, ordering the pooling of the assets and debts of related companies together whenever this is "just and equitable" (while taking into account a range of factors).
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As noted above, INSOL suggests allowing the merging of proceedings only in circumstances where the affairs of companies belonging to the same group were intermingled. This proposal is very appropriate. It is in this kind of group functional structure (and in this kind only) 83 that substantive consolidation will not result with redistribution and would not be unfair. It would also be the least costly course of action, and would not defeat the merits of limited liability and 'asset partitioning'. 84 In those groups that were heavily integrated (in terms of their assets and debts) there was 'a façade of asset partitioning'. 85 That is, the evidence suggests that there was no partitioning as a matter of economic realities. Furthermore, the intermingling between the entities in these scenarios resulted in a situation where all creditors in fact belonged to the group as a whole, and therefore a fair distribution means that all assets of the group should be available for distribution to all creditors. The claims subject to the substantive consolidation order cannot be ascertainable against a specific group member (with reasonable effort) and therefore it cannot be shown that a creditor could have gained more by remaining 'attached' to a particular entity. A substantive consolidation mechanism allows for a group-wide distribution (and avoids an arbitrary distribution of assets on a member-by-member basis), and also eliminates costs of attempting to untangle the web of connections. The possibility to exclude certain entities or certain creditors from the substantive consolidation in case their debts were ascertainable 86 further ensures that there is no 'redistribution' of rights.
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The only limitation with INSOL proposals in this respect is where they stress that only in circumstances where it is impossible to disentangle the businesses of the relevant group members, substantive consolidation should be allowed. Specifically, it is mentioned that substantive consolidation should not be allowed when it is only costly to separate the business. It must be appreciated, though, that this distinction (between impossible and costly)
is a very fine one, and one can litigate extensively on whether disentangling is very costly, 84 The segregation of assets and debts between a company and its shareholders or the members of a corporate group reduces transaction costs as creditors do not need to monitor the creditworthiness of other group members when they extend credit to a particular entity. (H Hansmann and R Kraakman "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387). 85 This matter is further discussed in Mevorach (n 9), chap 6 section 6.3. 86 See note 30 and accompanying text. extremely costly or completely impossible. In this respect it seems that the drafting of the recommendation (regarding substantive consolidation) proposed by UNCITRAL is preferable as it refers to circumstances where the assets or liabilities of the enterprise group members are intermingled to such an extent that the ownership of assets and responsibility for liabilities cannot be identified without disproportionate expense or delay. 88 It is notable that this solution is gradually gaining support on the international level.
UNCITRAL has included substantive consolidation in the new addition to the Insolvency Guide. 89 The European Parliament has also suggested (in the draft report to the Commission mentioned above), that in circumstances where the assets of the group are so confused that the estates cannot be kept separate, substantive aggregation should apply.
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Concluding remarks
No doubt the proposals of INSOL could contribute to reform considerations within Europe as well as in other regions or internationally. It can also be a source for ideas for national regimes considering reform in this area. Specifically, the concept of substantive consolidation suggested by INSOL is very appropriate as it is confined to a limited scenario where the group's affairs were highly intermingled. It is also generally in line with other proposals on the international level. It can be predicted that in light of the growing consensus on the contours of substantive consolidation, the concept can be taken on board by the Commission when revising the EC Regulation. However, it is also possible that substantive consolidation will be viewed as a concept that does not fall squarely within the ambit of the EC Regulation (which is primarily a private international law tool). If this will be the case, then substantive consolidation (and possibly other provisions for groups including the avoidance of transactions involving group members and group reorganisations 91 ) may be adopted in a different regulation or a directive.
The coordination regime proposed by INSOL is essential, especially in cases of an integrated group whose stakeholders could benefit from group-wide solutions. The idea of letting a 'group main proceedings' to coordinate the process will further facilitate such solutions (though situations where an EU ultimate parent cannot be identified should also be taken into account). However, in many cases groups are centrally controlled in the course of business.
Therefore, it should be stressed that in these cases a more efficient solution could be achieved if a multijurisdictional process is avoided and the proceedings are centralised in a single forum. It is very likely that the notion of coordination of group insolvency proceedings will be embraced within the forthcoming revised version of the Regulation. Generally, there is room for improvement of the provisions regarding cooperation between main and secondary proceedings (in single company cases) in the Regulation. Thus, while expanding the relevant provisions (e.g. delineating methods of cooperation such as the use of protocols and court-tocourt communication) it is sensible to ensure that they can apply to groups as well, explicitly allowing cooperation between parallel proceedings involving members of the same corporate group. 92 As such, it is hoped that the revision will take that additional step and adopt INSOL's idea of allowing coordination by one of the forums. Indeed, even full centralisation (avoiding multiple proceedings) in the relevant cases seems an achievable outcome in the 91 Considering INSOL's proposals in Chapter VI of their Report (on group rescue plans), and possibly also UNCITRAL's recommendations on the domestic aspects pertaining to enterprise groups in insolvency (in Part III of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide). Specifically, recommendations 217-218 deal with voidable transactions involving enterprise groups and recommendations 237-238 with group reorganisations. 92 See also UNCITRAL's recommendations regarding cooperation between parallel proceedings against group members (recommendations 240-254, Part III of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) which also include the possibility of appointing the same insolvency representative to all group members' proceedings; I Mevorach, 'European Insolvency Law in a Global Context' (2011) 7 J.B.L. 666, 673-675.
